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Housing subsidies for low income households are a central pillar of many welfare systems, but an expensive one.
This paper investigates the consequences of an unusual policy aimed at reducing the cost of these subsidies by
rationing tenants' use of space. Speciﬁcally, we study a policy introduced by the UK Government in 2013, which
substantially cut housing beneﬁts for tenants deemed to have a ‘spare’ bedroom – based on speciﬁc criteria related
to household composition. Our study is the ﬁrst to evaluate the impacts of the policy on its target group using a
strategy that compares the observed changes in behaviour of the treated households to those of a control group.
The treatment and control groups are deﬁned by the detail of the policy rules. We ﬁnd that – as expected – the
treated group loses housing beneﬁts and overall income. Although the policy was not successful in encouraging
residential moves (despite efforts to make mobility within the social sector easier), it did incentivise people who
moved to downsize – suggesting some success in terms of one of the policy goals, namely reducing under-
occupancy. The policy did not incentivise people to work more and we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant effects
on households' food consumption or saving behaviour. The implication of our ﬁndings is that this type of policy
has limited power to change housing consumption or employment in the short run. While it might reduce the
costs of housing subsidies to the taxpayer, it does so by imposing a direct ﬁnancial cost to social tenants unable or
unwilling to downsize.1. Introduction
Housing subsidies for low income households are a central pillar of
many welfare systems, but an expensive one. In Britain in 2015/16,
housing beneﬁt expenditure was £24.2 billion, amounting to 14% of total
expenditure on beneﬁts – an increase of 43% in real terms in the 20 years
since 1996/7.1 Attempts have been made to control these expenditures,
in Britain and in similar schemes world-wide, spawning a small academic
literature on the effect of these reforms on rents (Susin, 2002; Gibbons
andManning, 2006; Fack, 2006; Kangasharju, 2010; Viren, 2013; Brewer
et al., 2014). This paper investigates the consequences of an unusual
policy aimed at reducing the burden of these housing subsidies by ra-
tioning tenants' use of space and reallocating the social housing stock.
In April 2012, the UK Government voted for a policy which took effect
in April 2013 to reduce subsidy payments (housing beneﬁt) for social
tenants deemed to have a ‘spare’ bedroom on the basis of speciﬁc criteriaformance, London School of Eco
anchez-Vidal).
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t al., The bedroom tax, Rrelated to household composition. This policy – ofﬁcially named the
‘under-occupancy penalty’ – was much criticised for its draconian regu-
lation of low income tenants' entitlement to space and for its potential
adverse impacts on their welfare (Shelter, 2013). The policy was
euphemistically labelled the ‘removal of the spare room subsidy’ by its
advocates, but it was more commonly known as the ‘bedroom tax’. The
policy targeted new and existing social tenants – that is, tenants in Local
Authority (LA) provided housing or accommodation provided by housing
associations and other registered social landlords – but did not directly
affect those in or entering private rental accommodation, even if they
were claiming housing beneﬁts.
Our study is the ﬁrst to evaluate the impacts of the policy on its target
group considering a range of outcomes and using a difference-in-
difference methodology that compares the observed behaviour of
treated families with the outcomes of a suitable control group. Although
an ofﬁcial evaluation exists – using a survey of affected tenants and anomics and Political Science, UK.
ad tables, 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
s.
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treatment-control comparisons, no pre-policy survey and no adjustments
for differential household characteristics.
In order to carry out our investigation, we use a large panel survey of
individuals and households – the Understanding Society (US) survey –
covering the period 2009 to 2015. We carefully deﬁne our treatment and
control groups according to the policy rules. Speciﬁcally, this means we
ﬁrst take the subset of the survey respondents who are social tenants in
receipt of housing beneﬁts and who have no retired household members.
We then deﬁne the treated group as the set of households that are ‘under-
occupying’ their accommodation using the ofﬁcial criteria – while the
control group comprises of households who do not ‘under-occupy’ their
residence. The details on these under-occupancy criteria are described
later in the paper, but broadly depend on the number of adults and on the
number of children – with the number of rooms ‘available’ for the latter
depending on their age and gender. We estimate the effect of the policy
using regression analysis on household level data, with household ﬁxed
effects and controls for household composition and characteristics. This
design means that we compare the pre-post policy changes in outcomes
for social tenant households who under-occupy their accommodation
with the pre-post policy changes for comparable households who do not.
The sample restrictions dictated by this research design imply that we
end up with a relatively small sample of around 200 treated households
and 640 control households – observed multiple times before and after
the policy intervention. Admittedly, the small sample size means some of
our results are imprecisely estimated. However, the likely persistence
over time of the outcomes we study in the absence of any policy treat-
ment effects imparts our study with more statistical power than these
sample sizes might at ﬁrst suggest.
In a nutshell, we ﬁnd that, as expected, the treated group experienced
losses to housing beneﬁts and overall income – as well as to labour in-
come. However, the policy was unsuccessful in encouraging residential
moves – though tenants who moved did downsize. We are unable to
exactly determine how the tenants who did not move adjusted to these
income reductions: we ﬁnd no adjustment to food consumption or sav-
ings, although changes in consumption featured in studies based on self-
reported behaviour in Clarke et al. (2015) and Bragg et al. (2015).
Furthermore, point estimates of the effects of the policy on wellbeing and
material deprivation are in line with what was predicted by its critics –
i.e., that the policy caused affected tenants some hardship. However, the
estimates are too imprecisely measured to be conclusive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
provide some institutional context and explain the hypotheses we intend
to test In Section 3, we discuss the data we use and in Section 4 we
present our empirical methods. In Section 5, we present descriptive sta-
tistics and regression results. Section 6 provides some concluding
remarks.
2. Policy background and expected outcomes
2.1. Institutional context
In 2013 – at the time of the enforcement of the bedroom tax –
approximately 5 million individuals received housing beneﬁts. Of these,
around 3.4 million were accommodated in units provided by Local Au-
thorities (LAs or councils) and registered social landlords and housing
associations (HA, not-for-proﬁt organisations that provide homes for
people in housing need), while 1.6 million were housed in privately
owned accommodation. Given the number of households in the UK
(approximately, 26 million in 2011), this means that roughly 13% of
families in the UK occupy social housing – with this ﬁgure increasing to
19% if households in private accommodations but on housing beneﬁts
are included. This corresponds to approximately 45%–50% of all
households renting in the UK.2The percentage of social renters has remained relatively stable since
the early 2000s. However, the stock of social housing has shrunk
dramatically since the 1980s as councils sold off large proportions of
their stock and built no new housing. This decline was driven by a policy
to promote homeownership and reduce the role of the state in housing
provision – speciﬁcally the ‘right-to-buy’ scheme introduced by Margaret
Thatcher in 1980 – as well as changing perceptions of the role of social
housing, which came to be seen as a safety net for individuals in need (see
Hills, 2007 and Holmans, 2005 for a more detailed historical account).
Notwithstanding, the incidence of (relative) poverty climbed during this
same period – especially during the 1980s – and has remained stable
since then (see Belﬁeld et al., 2014).
As a result of these opposing trends, publicly provided housing today
mainly accommodates poor households and demand for social housing
greatly outstrips supply – with long waiting lists to gain access to it (1.16
million households were on the waiting list for 1.59 million council
houses in England in 2017).2 In order to ration social housing provision,
LAs and HAs have regulations that vary in their exact detail. These
specify who is eligible – although evidence of needs is paramount, as well
as how long an individual or a household has resided in the area.
Furthermore, some LAs grant an element of choice to households on their
waiting list – offering them the opportunity to apply for speciﬁc dwell-
ings – while others simply operate a direct offer system with no choice
component. Different LAs have different regulations regarding the size of
the property for which a household will be considered. Some attention is
given to the number of household members, their age, their gender and
their relationship. However, central government guidelines dictate that
priority should be given to the homeless, to those living in unsanitary or
overcrowded conditions, and to those who need to live in a given location
because of special medical/welfare reasons. Therefore, when allocating
social housing, the precise alignment of accommodation type and size to
family circumstances is second order to issues of basic household need.
Another important aspect to bear in mind is that social tenants are
offered a right to occupy their property indeﬁnitely – i.e., they do not
need to move if their household composition and characteristics change.
LAs and HAs try to promote tenants' mobility, especially when a house-
hold's accommodation is ‘too big’ for its needs, so that other families in
overcrowded conditions can move in. However, historically there has
been no compulsion or explicit sanction for under-occupancy.
As a result of this imperfect matching of new tenants to homes and of
existing tenants' immobility, many households were occupying homes
deemed ‘too big’ for them at the time the bedroom tax reform was
introduced (we will clarify what ‘too big’ means later in this section).
This situation will have arisen either because they were initially allocated
to over-size accommodation due to a shortage of properties that better
suited them, or because of subsequent changes in their household
composition (e.g., a child ageing and leaving home).
Housing beneﬁts in Britain are calculated on the basis of local social
housing rents with some deductions if the household income is above a
certain threshold. In turn, social housing rents at the time of the bedroom
tax policy were calculated from a formula, which aimed to bring LA rents
in line with housing association rents and provide consistency in rents
across different areas. This formula starts from a baseline ﬁgure anchored
to mean national housing association rents in 2000 (£53.50 per week, at a
time when private sector rents were around £85). Rents are then updated
over time and across space using a formula that adjusts this baseline by:
a-multiplying it by ratio of the average ‘manual’ (unskilled) earnings of
individuals in the county relative to the national average; b-considering a
‘bedroom factor’ that reduces rents for smaller accommodation; c-
modifying them to reﬂect average housing prices in the LA relative to
national ones in 1999; and d-adjusting for inﬂation using the retail pricetables: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-
rents-lettings-and-tenancies.
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thus housing beneﬁts offered to individuals – across the UK. For example,
in 2013–2014 on average, the weekly beneﬁt for households in homes
provided by LAs and HAs were approximately £80. However, families
living in the most expensive areas of the UK – for example the boroughs
of Westminster, Camden, Hackney and Kensington – would receive up to
£85 more, while families in the cheapest area of the country – Moray, a
Scottish council – would receive around £25 less. Similarly, families in
London would receive higher beneﬁts, while households in other large
urban conurbations – e.g., Manchester, Liverpool and Newcastle – would
receive about the average amount of housing beneﬁts.4
Note also that most individuals living in housing provided by councils
do not actually pay any rents or receive any beneﬁts – as these are
transferred directly from the government to the ‘housing account’ of the
LA. Similar arrangements are often set up for tenants of HAs and other
social landlords.5
Against this backdrop, the UK Government passed legislation in April
2012 taking effect in April 2013 that would reduce housing beneﬁts for
social tenants deemed to have a ‘spare’ bedroom. The aim of the legis-
lation was twofold. On the one hand, this was an attempt to curb in-
creases in social housing expenditure, which had been steadily rising
since the 1990s. On the other hand, the Government hoped to promote
mobility and the reallocation of the social housing stock to better match
households' size and needs. As discussed above, families occupying more
space than needed coexisted in the sector with households living in over-
crowding conditions for historical and institutional reasons.
In particular, the ‘bedroom tax’ legislation dictated that one bedroom
would be allowed for the following groups: a-every adult couple; b-any
other adult aged 16 or over – including any son, daughter, stepson/
stepdaughter; c-two children under 10; d-two children under 16 of the
same sex; e-any other child (where, for example, there are three children
under 10). Anyone deemed as having one spare bedroom would face a
14% cut in the beneﬁts, while households with two under-occupied
rooms would face cuts of 25%.
According to ofﬁcial ﬁgures, approximately 660,000 – or nearly 20%
of social housing tenants on beneﬁts –were liable for the ‘bedroom tax’ in
2013. This would imply average shortfalls of £11 and £20 for one and two
under-occupied rooms respectively – and up to £23-£40 in the most
expensive parts of the country. Note that these shortfalls had to be paid in
cash directly from the tenants to the LA or HA – unlike rents which (as
discussed) were usually directly offset against beneﬁts – making this a
salient and signiﬁcant cut in individuals' ﬁnances.
To help social tenants deal with the bedroom tax, councils, housing
associations and housing charities (such as Shelter) published a number
of advisory guidelines. These included recommending that social tenants
take on additional work – as well as providing discussion of the potential
implications in terms of deductions from housing beneﬁts for earnings
above certain thresholds – and taking on lodgers (legally allowed if
agreed with the owner of the property). Furthermore, LAs and HAs
created or improved their ‘housing swap’ portals and websites with the
aim of coordinating the mobility of tenants on housing beneﬁts to more
suitable accommodations within the social sector – thus avoiding3 Note that factors a- and b-had a weight of 70%, while c-had a weight of 30%
in this calculation. Our ﬁgure for private sector rents is taken from Udagawa and
Tang (2008). Details of the rent formula are available in HCA (2015).
4 These ﬁgures and considerations refer to individuals in accommodations
owned by LAs and HAs. Individuals eligible for housing support but renting
privately owned accommodations received rents in proportion to a Local
Housing Allowance (LHA) calculated on the basis of an adjusted private sector
rent that varies according to the number of available rooms in the property. As
these individuals were not subject to the bedroom tax, we do not discuss this
part of the publicly-supported housing market in detail.
5 Once again, the arrangements are different for individuals receiving housing
beneﬁts but occupying privately owned accommodations. These receive beneﬁts
in their accounts and are responsible for paying rents to the private landlord.
3payment of the bedroom tax. There was thus a considerable effort by the
involved authorities to publicise the policy, suggest potential responses,
and facilitate moving. However, anecdotal evidence and discussions with
LA/HA ‘welfare reform managers’ suggests that portals (and other
mobility channels) were not widely used.
More drastic measures were taken by the Scottish Government which
between 2013/2014 and 2016/2017 injected £125 million of additional
funding for Discretionary Housing Payments to mitigate the effects of the
bedroom tax,6 and by Northern Ireland where the bedroom tax was not
put in place till February 2017 – and even then came with a large asso-
ciated mitigation fund.7 Some discretionary payments were also made by
LAs in England and Wales, although the scope and extent of these pay-
ments was much more limited. Furthermore, affected households in
England and Wales had to re-apply for these payments on a quarterly
basis limiting ease of access and actual take-up. For these reasons, we
limit our empirical analysis to England and Wales.2.2. Expected outcomes of the policy
The two main goals of the policy were to: i-cut public expenditure on
housing beneﬁts; and ii-incentivise tenants in over-sized homes to relo-
cate to smaller accommodation. We thus ﬁrst expect to see effects on
housing beneﬁts received by households. Furthermore, if the policy
worked as intended, we would also expect to see that it encouraged
affected tenants to move home – and to move to a smaller
accommodation.
However, there are many reasons why tenants may have found it
difﬁcult or impossible to move or may not have wanted to – some of
which we already discussed in Section 2.1. First, even if tenants want to
move, doing so within the social housing sector is not fast or straight-
forward because of lack of available and suitable space – something
which was not addressed or facilitated in the aftermath of the policy.
Indeed, according to one survey of LAs, the number of small homes
available at the time the policy was introducedwould have re-housed just
under 4% of the affected households.8 Second, even if housing was
available, households may have preferred not to move or had constraints
– such as local jobs, schooling, and family ties – that meant that moving
was very costly.
These non-moving tenants would have suffered a reduction in bene-
ﬁts income and would have had to adjust their behaviour in ways other
than by reducing housing consumption. We therefore expect to see effects
along one or more of the following margins: i-number of people in
employment and labour/overall income; ii-savings and/or consumption
(as a function of changes in overall/labour/beneﬁt income); iii-changes
in indicators of standards of living, deprivation and hardship; iv-changes
in levels of satisfaction (stemming from changes in labour participation,
income, consumption and standards of living).
Standard economic theories of labour supply would imply that a cut
in beneﬁts should lead to an increase in labour supply – through the
income effect on consumption of leisure. However, the reality in our
context is not so straightforward because beneﬁts are means-tested and
withdrawal of beneﬁts, including housing beneﬁt, can imply marginal tax
rates of 100%. Furthermore, housing beneﬁts are calculated at the
household level, so household members' labour supply responses are6 See Section 7.3 of the Welfare Reform ofﬁcial Scottish documentation
available at: http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2017/06/6808/8#s73.
7 See ofﬁcial documentation available at: https://www.nihe.gov.uk/index/
advice/advice_for_housing_executive_tenants/beneﬁts-social-sector-size-criteria-
bedroom-tax.htm.
8 See “‘Big lie’ behind the bedroom tax: Families trapped with nowhere to
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individuals more than others to react by changing their employment
status depending on the number of hours worked and wages at baseline.
Lastly, as noted by Chetty et al. (2009), individual responses to complex
policy changes are not always fully rational.
With these theoretical channels in mind, our empirical analysis fo-
cuses on three outcomes that are fundamental targets of the policy – i.e.,
housing beneﬁt, residential mobility, accommodation size/occupancy –
and a number of incidental outcomes reﬂecting other margins on which
households may have adjusted or experienced changes – namely, overall
income, labour income, employment, savings, food expenditure, in-
dicators of deprivation and indicators of wellbeing.
3. Data construction and sample selection criteria
We use household and individual level data from the Understanding
Society (US) survey. US is a longitudinal annual survey conducted by the
Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at Essex University.
The sample was selected to be nationally representative of households in
the UK and every adult member of the sampled households (age 16 or
above) is interviewed using a computer assisted personal interview
(CAPI) software. One individual per household – usually the household
head – answers the household questionnaire. Younger individuals (age
10–15) respond to a shorter, self-completion questionnaire.
The ﬁrst wave was collected during the time window covering
January 2009 and 2011 and each subsequent wave spans overlapping 3-
year periods. The same households and individuals sampled in the ﬁrst
wave are re-interviewed in subsequent waves – approximately 12months
after the ﬁrst survey. Households and individuals who move within the
UK are followed to their new address, and new individuals joining the
sampled households are also interviewed. The ﬁrst two waves included
approximately 30,000 individuals though the number progressively
declined in the subsequent waves.
The survey covers a number of topics including family structure,
educational attainment, labour market outcomes, ﬁnancial resources,
tenure and housing conditions, and beneﬁt eligibility and claims. As
such, it is well designed to study the impact of policy interventions as
well as general trends in socio-economic outcomes in the UK population.
For our analysis, we retain data covering the period 2009 to 2015 –
taken from six waves of US data. Given that the bedroom tax policy was
announced in April 2012 and enforced in April 2013, this gives 3 years
and 4 months of data before the announcement of the reform and 3 years
and 8 months after it. Furthermore, since the reform targeted families
already in social housing and receiving housing beneﬁts, we only keep
households who are social tenants on housing beneﬁts in the pre-policy
period (more precisely, in the last observation before the policy
announcement). This group includes tenants in LA-provided housing as
well as households in accommodation provided by housing associations
and other registered social landlords. On the other hand, we exclude
families on social beneﬁts but in private rental accommodation as these
families were not targeted by the policy. As discussed in Section 2, we
also exclude Scotland and Northern Ireland as these put in places mea-
sures that likely neutralized the effects or delayed the implementation of
the ‘bedroom tax’.9 Finally, given the policy did not apply to families
containing a retired person, we drop households from the sample if they
include a male aged above 60 or a woman aged above 55 – i.e., ﬁve years
before retirement age. As already mentioned, the policy affected families
with a ‘spare room’. The notion of spare room was based on very detailed
criteria about room occupancy that would consider the age, the gender9 We considered using Scotland as ‘control’ country to investigate the impact
of the ‘bedroom tax’ by comparing individuals just north/south of the border
with England. Unfortunately, the US does not sample a sufﬁcient number of
households to give enough geographical density to properly implement this
research design.
4and the relationship between household members. These criteria are
discussed in detail in the next section, when we deﬁne ‘treated’ and
‘control’ households – i.e., those with and without a spare room.
Some important aspects of our sample selection criteria are worth
mentioning. First, we do not use the latest available years of the US data
(2016 and part of 2017), because other beneﬁts-related policies – espe-
cially Universal Credit (UC) – came into play and it is increasingly un-
likely that we can reliably attribute changes in behaviour to the effects of
the bedroom tax policy. However, it is important to note that, while the
UC was passed in the same bill as the bedroom tax, at ﬁrst it only affected
new beneﬁt claimants – which are not included in our sample – and was
only slowly rolled out to existing claimants. Ofﬁcial ﬁgures show that by
May 2015 the number of beneﬁt claimants on UC was 65000 – or
approximately 2% of the total beneﬁt caseload.10 Furthermore, UC did
not affect tenants with/without spare bedrooms differentially, making it
very unlikely that this reform has any bearing on our ﬁndings.
Second, we drop from our analysis private renters on beneﬁts – and do
not consider them as a possible control group – for the following reasons:
i-while they were not targeted by the bedroom tax, they were affected by
changes to the Local Housing Allowance – i.e., the amount that private
tenants can claim in housing beneﬁt (which instead did not affect in-
dividuals in social housing); and ii-as a group they are unlikely to be
comparable to social renters in terms of income, housing beneﬁts, rents,
mobility and a range of other relevant characteristics (we conﬁrmed this
intuition by comparing their pre-policy characteristics).
As set out in Section 2.2, we investigate a wide range of relevant
outcome variables at the household level. To capture possible effects on
household size and space we use number of bedrooms, number of
household members and number of rooms per person – taken directly
from the household-level questionnaire. For residential mobility, we
construct a dummy indicating whether the households' spatial location
(geographical coordinates) has changed between one survey and the
next. Household overall income, labour income and social beneﬁts in-
come variables are derived by aggregating the individual-level data
across household members.11 Given that the reform entailed a cut in
housing subsidies for the affected households, we also single out the
amount of housing subsidies received by the household from the total
income obtained from beneﬁts. Employment responses are captured by
counting the number of people working in the household, which is
constructed by aggregating an individual-level dummy indicator that
captures whether or not the respondent is in paid employment at the
survey date. Saving behaviour is represented by a dummy variable
identifying whether the household makes some savings at the end of the
month, and a continuous variable that measures the weekly amount of
money spent on food.
The approach of McFall and Garrington (2011) is further used to
construct three proxies for households' material deprivation. The ﬁrst one
is an indicator of ‘lifestyle changes’ that considers answers to the
following questions: whether the occupied house is in decent state of
repair; whether the household takes holidays at least once per year;
whether worn out furniture can be replaced; whether the household has
insurance; whether major electrical goods can be replaced/repaired; and
whether individuals in the household have money for their selves. The
second indicator gathers information about ‘ﬁnancial stress’ by consid-
ering whether the household is able to: keep up with bills; keep up with
council tax payments; keep up with rents; and overall up to date with all
bills. The third indicator, instead, relates to ‘durable good purchase’ and
considers the following items: colour TV; video/DVD; satellite; cable TV;
deep freezer; washing machine; tumble drier; dish washer; microwave;10 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/ﬁle/435409/universal-credit-statistics-to-28-may-2015.pdf.
11 Note that since income questions refer to monthly amounts, we obtain
weekly ﬁgures by multiplying all numbers by 12 and dividing it by 52. This
follows standard practice.
12 We also estimated by conditional logit. Unfortunately, this estimator did not
converge when using the full set of LA-by-year ﬁxed effects. If we drop these
ﬁxed effects and estimate conditional logits (absorbing family unobservables αi),
the results are similar in their implications to the OLS estimates.
13 Our approach deﬁnes ‘treatment’ using household composition before the
policy announcement and holding it ﬁxed over time. However, households
might switch status because of changes to their composition that can be
considered exogenous – e.g., the ageing of a child that makes him/her entitled to
a room. In some extensions, we explored whether our results differed if we
allowed the treatment status to change on the basis of characteristics that
households cannot manipulate (i.e., mainly the gender and age of the children),
S. Gibbons et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics xxx (xxxx) xxxhome PC; compact disc player; landline telephone; mobile phone. In
order to analyse whether the policy had an impact on levels of depriva-
tion, we construct three separate indicators by summing the various
items in the three different groups – i.e. ‘lifestyle’, ‘ﬁnancial stress’ and
‘durable goods’ – and then standardizing the resulting numbers in the full
sample (i.e., prior to only focussing on households on beneﬁts and in
council/housing association provided accommodations). Given the way
in which answers are coded in US, larger values of the ‘lifestyle’ and
‘ﬁnancial stress’ variables correspond to worse outcomes, while smaller
values of the ‘durable goods’ variable correspond to worsening standards
of living. An overall material deprivation index is obtained by summing
all the answers in the ‘lifestyle’ and ‘ﬁnancial stress’ categories and
subtracting the ‘durable good’ answers – and standardizing the resulting
ﬁgures in the full sample. Larger values of this indicator correspond to
worse material standards of living. Lastly, to measure household well-
being, we average individual responses to questions on life satisfaction.
This is measured along four dimensions: health; income; the amount of
leisure time; and life overall. The answers to these questions range from
“Completely dissatisﬁed” – coded to 1 – to “Completely satisﬁed” – coded
to 7. We treat this variable as ordinal with larger values corresponding to
higher levels of satisfaction – though in some checks we investigated
whether our ﬁndings are robust to dichotomising these indicators.
Descriptive statistics and number of observations for the retained
households and variables are provided in Section 5 – after we discuss our
empirical methods and the deﬁnition of affected and unaffected house-
holds in the next section.
4. Empirical methods
The aim of our analysis is to estimate the causal effect of the bedroom
tax policy on a number of household outcomes for people in social
housing and on housing beneﬁts. The nature of the policy implies
treatment was not randomly allocated – rather, it was determined on the
basis of information about household size and composition, in relation to
the number of rooms in the occupied accommodation. The main concern
is that the same household and individual characteristics that determine
treatment might be correlated with the outcomes under analysis – either
directly or through other unobservable individual/household level at-
tributes – preventing us from estimating the causal impact of the
bedroom tax.
Our strategy for estimating this impact is to compare the pre-post-
policy change (before and after April 2013) in outcomes for treated
households who had a spare room according to the policy rules with the
pre-post-policy change in outcomes for comparable households who did
not. We do this using the following ﬁxed effects, difference-in-difference
regression speciﬁcation:
yitl ¼ αi þ δTreatiPostt þ
X
k
ΛkXpreki þ θtl þ εitl (1)
In this speciﬁcation, yitl denotes outcome for household i at time t and
living in LA l; Treati identiﬁes whether the household is subject to the
bedroom tax; and Post is a dummy variable indicating the observations
following the enforcement of the policy (i.e., April 2013; in some
robustness checks we use the policy announcement in April 2012 as the
cut-off date). In some versions of the speciﬁcation, we look at differences
between the effects of the policy on households who moved home at
some point between the policy announcement and the end of our
observation window and those who did not by interacting the treatment
and post-policy dummy with the mover indicator.
Our speciﬁcation further allows households with different charac-
teristics to have different time trends, using interactions between the post
indicator and household characteristics ðXpreki Þ measured prior to the
policy announcement (the k indexes the characteristic, speciﬁcally,
average age, length of tenure in current accommodation and number of
bedrooms per person). We also allow for differential geographical time5trends and policy shocks using LA-by-year ﬁxed effects (θtlÞ. The unob-
servable αi is a household-level ﬁxed effect, potentially correlated with
treatment, while εitl is an error term assumed to be uncorrelated with the
other variables in our empirical model. Finally, we include survey wave
dummies and quarter-by-year dummies in the regressions – hence there is
no un-interacted post dummy in equation (1) – but for simplicity suppress
these in the notation. Parameter δ is the parameter of interest.
This equation is estimated on the sample of social housing tenants,
receiving housing beneﬁts, extracted from the US data from 2009 to 2015
and described in Section 3. Estimation is by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
even when the dependent variable is a binary outcome.12 Since we do not
have a balanced number of observations per household before/after the
policy and given that we do not expect any effects to result in one-year
changes in the considered outcomes, we control for ﬁxed effects by
within-group differencing – rather than ﬁrst differencing. Standard errors
are clustered at the household level, to allow for heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation within households over time.
We categorise households in our data as treated or control by infer-
ring whether they would have been affected by the policy according to its
rules. This is done by comparing the information on household compo-
sition and accommodation size, with the detailed and speciﬁc policy
criteria used by the government to establish whether families had a spare
room. Household and accommodation characteristics are ﬁxed to those
recorded in the last household observation prior to April 2012 when the
policy was announced. As discussed, the legislation dictated that one
bedroom would be allowed for the following main groups: a-every adult
couple; b-any other adult aged 16 or over – including any son, daughter,
stepson/stepdaughter; c-two children under 10; d-two children under 16
of the same sex; e-any other child (where, for example, there are three
children under 10). Although these were the main features of the legis-
lation, speciﬁc guidelines were provided for individuals with disabilities
and their carers – for example, two adults forming a couple could occupy
different rooms if one or both individuals had disabilities making it more
appropriate to have separate spaces within the house. Other exceptions
were also made for individuals serving in the armed forces and/or for
students residing away from home. In order to determine households
with a ‘spare room’, we only consider the main categories as we are not
able to identify individuals subject to these exceptions. This omission is
unlikely to substantially affect our treatment and control group variables
as these groups should only involve small numbers of individuals.13
Based on these guidelines, we consider a household as treated if it
occupies more rooms than it is entitled to. Conversely, we label a
household as a control if it resides in an accommodation with the correct
number of rooms given its demographic structure. Note that the policy
dictated that social tenants with one under-occupied room would face a
14% cut in the beneﬁts, while households on beneﬁts with two under-
occupied rooms would face cuts of 25%. In our data, most treated
households have one under-occupied room, so we do not consider this
distinction.
The identifying assumption in this difference-in-difference/ﬁxed-
effects panel design is that treatment – having a spare room, as deﬁned
by these arbitrary and nuanced policy rules – is effectively random,
conditional on the ﬁxed effects and the control variables included in thebut they remained the same.
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room or not under these rules was largely the outcome of historical ac-
cidents related to the kind of accommodation the family was originally
given and subsequent changes in household age and composition (see
discussion in Section 2). We discuss the empirical validity of this
assumption in the next section where we look at the ‘balancing’ of
baseline (pre-policy announcement) characteristics in the treatment and
control groups.
Notwithstanding these considerations, our treatment is essentially an
indicator of a very speciﬁc set of interactions between household size,
number of bedrooms and the age of household members. It is thus
important to control for general trends related to these factors, which
might drive the pre-post policy change in outcomes. The interaction
terms between pre-determined household characteristics (age, length of
tenure and bedrooms per person) and the post dummy included in our
empirical model (1) play precisely this role: they capture the impact of
time trends in outcomes that could be related to family structure and
accommodation size. Furthermore, LA-by-year dummies control for un-
observed time-varying shocks at the LA level – e.g., changes in the
affordability of housing or other possible housing-related local policy
changes – that might be related to both treatment and outcomes. We also
tried controlling for linear time trends interacted with a treatment-group
status indicator. This approach did not change the results presented
below in any meaningful way.14
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
We present descriptive evidence in Table 1. This reports statistics
(unweighted) at the household level for the variables used in our anal-
ysis. These are measured in the last observation period prior to the policy
announcement and tabulated for the treated and control groups. Along-
side the means and standard deviations, we report t-tests for the differ-
ence in means between the two groups.
There are overall 203 treated households and 641 controls, meaning
that around 24% of households in our base sample of social tenants on
housing beneﬁts are in the treated group.15 As we expect given the
deﬁnition of treatment, treated households differ signiﬁcantly from the
controls in terms of size of household (2.2 for treated, 3.0 for controls),
dwelling size (2.7 bedrooms for treated, 2.1 for controls) and bedrooms
per person (1.6 for treated, 0.8 for controls). The two groups also differ
signiﬁcantly in terms of average age (35.6 years for treatment, 25.9 years
for controls). This likely reﬂects the fact that the deﬁnition of treatment
depends on the age of children and that control households will have
younger children. Treated households also have signiﬁcantly longer
tenure (over 3 years longer) in their current accommodation.
Looking at the pre-policy magnitudes of the outcome variables we
investigate, we see no statistically signiﬁcant difference in mobility rates
between treatment (6.4%) and controls (8.8%). A concern for our anal-
ysis would be if the US data we use cannot track households who move –
meaning we fail to detect moves in the data. However, comparing the
overall one-year mobility rates in our data with the corresponding14 Braackman and McDonald (2018) investigate the impact of changes in the
Local Housing Allowance (LHA) on property prices. As already discussed, while
this reform occurred at the same time as the bedroom tax we analyse, it only
affected private renters on housing beneﬁts – which are excluded from our
analysis, Furthermore, the implied variation in the LHA changes was at the
LA-by-year level – so any potential confounding effects are controlled for in our
speciﬁcations. Lastly, it should also be noticed that relative to the potential
subsidy cuts implied by the bedroom tax policy, reforms to the LHA amounted to
relatively small reductions in housing beneﬁts.
15 Further statistics not reported show that approximately 57% of household
that rent the property they inhabit are social tenants. These ﬁgures line up with
the numbers discussed in Section 2 for the whole of the UK.
6mobility rates found in the Survey of English Housing – at 7.4% for social
tenants in 2014/15 – suggests this is not an issue. Housing beneﬁt income
is also similar in the two groups (at around £80), as is labour income
(around £43) though overall income is signiﬁcantly lower in the treat-
ment group (£314, lower by £34) due to lower social beneﬁts from other
sources. Once again, this reﬂects the fact that the control group has more
household members, while income is similar in the two groups if we look
at the individual level data (results not tabulated). Housing beneﬁt makes
up 27–30% of beneﬁts income. In both groups, labour income is a small
share of the total, in line with the fact that the average number of
working age people working in the household is under 0.4 in both
groups. Variables measuring other ﬁnancial aspects are similar across the
two groups. When dissimilar, this largely reﬂects the fact that the treated
households are smaller than the controls and have fewer younger chil-
dren. Only around 15% of both groups save money; average weekly food
expenditure is £48 in the treated group and £61 in the control group.16
Finally, pre-policy indicators of ﬁnancial distress and material hardship
are similar across groups (these variables are standardised indices).
As discussed in Section 4, our most stringent speciﬁcation controls for
interaction between average age, length of tenure in current accommo-
dation and number of bedrooms per person, and a dummy identifying the
post-enforcement periods. This allows for differential pre/post-policy
trends along these dimensions. Any time-ﬁxed components of these
household characteristics – as well as other time-ﬁxed unobservable
characteristics – is instead absorbed by the household ﬁxed effects we use
throughout our analysis.
Note that in our estimation sample that there are 639 pre-policy ob-
servations and 345 post-policy observations for the 203 treated house-
holds. There are also 1988 post-bedroom tax observations and 1176 pre-
policy observations for the 641 control households. However, the precise
numbers of data points vary according to the speciﬁcation being esti-
mated and the outcome analysed.
5.2. Effects on the targeted outcomes: housing beneﬁts, mobility and
household structure
We start by studying the ﬁrst key policy target – housing beneﬁt –
investigating whether the bedroom tax reduced the amount of housing
beneﬁt treated households receive relative to controls. Table 2, Columns
(1) to (3) show the coefﬁcients and standard errors for the corresponding
regression estimates of equation (1) for all households in our sample.
Columns (4)–(6) separate out the impact of the policy for families who
stay or move home by interacting the treatment variable and the post-
policy dummy indicator with a dummy identifying households that
relocate between surveys. Lastly, Columns (7)–(9) restrict the sample to
households that do not move. Columns (1), (4) and (7) control only for
household, LA-by-year, year-by-quarter and wave ﬁxed effects. Columns
(2), (5) and (8) control additionally for interactions between the post
indicator, and pre-policy average age and tenure length. Columns (3), (6)
and (9) add an interaction between the number of bedrooms per person
(measured pre-policy announcement) and the post dummy.
The ﬁrst three columns show that the policy did reduce housing
beneﬁt by approximately £7-£10 per week per household on a baseline of
around £80. This is not too far from the expected 14% reduction
mandated by the policy for anyone with one spare room. Columns (4) to
(9) reveal that all of the effect is concentrated on the households who do
not move home for whom the effect is the same size as that found on
average across the mover and stayer groups. The implied effect for
movers is negligible. Note that our preferred speciﬁcation is the one used
in Columns (2), (5) and (8). This controls for household and LA-by-year
unobservable effects – as well as for the possibility that the imbalances in16 We ﬁnd similar imbalances if we focus on food expenditure per person. This
suggests that differences in household size between treated and control units do
fully not explain the differences visible in Table 1.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and balancing tests before the reform.
Variables Treatments Controls Difference Difference (conditional on ﬁxed effects)
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Number of people 203 2.152 1.202 641 3.048 1.668 0.895*** 0.967***
Number of bedrooms 203 2.748 0.675 641 2.134 0.844 0.614*** 0.578***
Bedrooms per person 203 1.589 0.723 641 0.797 0.293 0.791*** 0.824***
Average age 203 35.60 13.11 641 25.89 12.52 9.709*** 11.72***
Tenure length 181 11.01 9.712 569 7.741 6.962 3.274*** 3.555***
Housing beneﬁts amount 203 78.84 34.28 641 82.07 36.21 3.229 5.602
Mobility 203 0.064 0.245 641 0.088 0.284 0.024 0.027
Overall income 203 314.2 159.7 641 348.5 159.0 34.27*** 13.57
Labour income 192 42.00 85.92 608 43.82 87.53 1.820 9.970
Social beneﬁts 203 265.6 122.6 641 296.7 135.9 31.12*** 24.87
Number of people working 203 0.374 0.595 641 0.396 0.634 0.021 0.009
Household saves money 203 0.152 0.360 641 0.152 0.360 0.000 0.042
Food expenditure 202 48.15 28.24 638 61.36 40.63 13.20*** 9.255**
Lifestyle changes 91 1.298 1.185 325 1.431 1.052 0.132 0.089
Financial stress 203 0.971 1.961 641 1.100 2.193 0.128 0.178
Durable goods purchase 203 0.480 0.921 639 0.529 0.974 0.049 0.168
Overall material deprivation 91 1.199 1.142 324 1.285 1.059 0.085 0.030
Satisfaction with health 183 3.46 1.769 582 4.085 1.696 0.622*** 0.798***
Satisfaction with income 183 2.966 1.576 581 3.246 1.560 0.280** 0.233
Satisfaction with amount of leisure 182 3.943 1.596 581 4.165 1.477 0.222* 0.156
Overall life satisfaction 183 3.793 1.705 582 4.146 1.647 0.353** 0.527**
Note: Number of household (HH) observations and variables measured prior to the policy announcement in April 2012 and using information gathered from the
interview prior to this date and closest in time. Overall number of household observations (without missing) as follow. Treated households: 639 observations before
treatment date and 345 observations after treatment date. Control households: 1988 before treatment date and 1176 observations after treatment date. Of these, 131
observations represent movers in the treated group before the policy and 67 after the policy. For the controls, these ﬁgures are of 463 observations of movers before the
policy and of 285 and after the policy. *: signiﬁcant at 10% level; **: signiﬁcant at 5% level; ***: signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Table 2
Housing beneﬁts (£/week).































Sample All All All All All All Stayers Stayers Stayers
Beds./person*Post N N Y N N Y N N Y
Age*Post N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Tenure*Post N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 4148 3764 3764 4148 3764 3764 3202 2903 2903
R-squared 0.764 0.767 0.767 0.765 0.768 0.768 0.786 0.788 0.788
Note: Table reports regression coefﬁcients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. ‘Treat’ is an indicator that household is affected by the
‘bedroom tax’ policy in that they would be deemed to have had a spare room at the time of the policy announcement in April 2012. ‘Post’ is an indicator for the pre-post
April 2013 period when policy enacted. ‘Beds./person’ is number of bedrooms per person. ‘Movers’ is an indicator that the household moved residential address at some
point over the post policy enforcement period. ‘Age’ refers to average age of household members. ‘Tenure’ is length of tenure in current accommodation pre-policy.
‘Household FE’ refers to household ﬁxed effects. ‘Wave FE’ refers to dummies for US survey waves. ‘LA x Year FE’ are interactions between LA and Year identiﬁers.
‘Quarter*Year FE’ are interactions of quarter and year dummies. *: signiﬁcant at 10% level; **: signiﬁcant at 5% level; ***: signiﬁcant at 1% level.
S. Gibbons et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics xxx (xxxx) xxxaverage age and tenure length between treated and control households
documented in Table 1 affect their outcomes post-treatment. We consider
the speciﬁcation reported in Column (3), (6) and (9) a robustness check
that controls for possible post-policy effects of baseline differences be-
tween treated and control households in terms of bedrooms-per-person.
In this regression, identiﬁcation of the policy effect comes from the
more nuanced aspects of the treatment group deﬁnition – rather than
simply from the pre-policy number of bedrooms per person. Neverthe-
less, all the results provide similar conclusions so only we report both
speciﬁcations for comparison in some of the remaining tables in this
section, and then focus on our preferred model.
So far, we have focussed on the enforcement date – i.e., we have7deﬁned as ‘post’ all time periods from April 2013. In Table 3, we study
whether housing beneﬁts change in response to the enforcement of the
policy as opposed to its announcement in April 2012. The table focuses
on stayers where we expect to observe an effect and presents the three
speciﬁcations analogous to Columns (7)–(9) of Table 2. We ﬁnd that the
enforcement date has a slightly larger effect when controlling for any
possible effect of the policy announcement on the treated households'
housing beneﬁts. Using our favourite speciﬁcation (Column 2), this
impact is found to be around £13 – while the announcement effect is
positive but insigniﬁcant. This evidence is reassuring about our empirical
design: we ﬁnd a policy effect on the variable most directly impacted by
the bedroom tax reform where we expect to ﬁnd it – and no effect where
Table 3














Sample Stayers Stayers Stayers
Beds./person*Enforcement N N Y
Age*Enforcement N Y Y
Tenure*Enforcement N Y Y
Bedrooms/person*Announcement N N Y
Age*Announcement N Y Y
Tenure*Announcement N Y Y
Household FE Y Y Y
Wave FE Y Y Y
LA*Year FE Y Y Y
Quarter*Year FE Y Y Y
Observations 3202 2903 2903
R-squared 0.786 0.788 0.788
Note: Table reports regression coefﬁcients and standard errors. Standard errors
clustered at the household level. ‘Enforcement’ is an indicator of pre-post policy
enforcement (April 2013). Announcement is an indicator of pre-post policy
announcement (April 2012). For other notes, see Table 2. *: signiﬁcant at 10%
level. **: signiﬁcant at 5% level. ***: signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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isolate the impact of the policy – while netting out other unobservable
characteristics that might contaminate our causal inference.
A more reﬁned event-study analysis of the effects on housing beneﬁt
is presented in Fig. 1, which is more revealing about the timing of the
impacts. The ﬁgure shows point estimates and associated 90% conﬁ-
dence intervals of the effect of the bedroom tax spanning ten quarters
before and after its enforcement (i.e., t¼ 0 is the post date of April 2013).
The omitted period against which all outcomes are benchmarked is
centred on ﬁve quarters before the policy came into force – i.e., one
quarter prior to the policy announcement in April 2012 when we might
start to see effects (this is also the mid-point in our pre-policy period).
The aim of the ﬁgure is twofold. First, it allows us to investigate whether
there are signiﬁcant pre-trends in housing beneﬁt receipt. Second, it al-
lows us to investigate when the reduction in housing beneﬁt starts, how
long it takes to fully materialise and how long it lasts. We ﬁnd that the
point estimates are negative in every quarter post-enforcement, relative
to the pre-announcement baseline, though only signiﬁcantly so for four
out of eleven quarters. There is little evidence of effects in the period
between announcement and enforcement. The precision of the estimates
decreases as we move away from the ‘post’ date. This is expected as
multiple other factors start to come into play obscuring the impact of the
policy. Overall, this evidence conﬁrms the insights gathered from Table 3
where we compared the impact of enforcement and announcement on
changes in housing beneﬁts – and found that only the former mattered.
We also studied event-study graphs in the style of Fig. 1 for some of
other outcomes discussed below. This analysis conﬁrmed that there were
no differential pre-trends, but otherwise revealed no more interesting
patterns than the simple pre/post policy difference in difference that we
capture with estimates of the empirical model in equation (1). For
brevity, we do not report them in the paper.17
Table 4 looks at the second of the key intended policy targets: resi-
dential mobility. The table clearly shows that the policy was not suc-
cessful in incentivising moves. If anything, the point estimates suggest
that the policy discouraged moves – relative to a baseline mobility 6.4%17 Results are however available in the working paper version of this paper
(Gibbons et al., 2018).
18 In results not tabulated we also investigated whether the effects on housing
beneﬁt and on mobility differed between types of social landlord, LAs ad HAs.
but found no signiﬁcant differences.
8in the treatment group – though the coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcant.18
Table 5 investigates the third intended policy outcome, namely use of
space in social housing. The reported regressions estimate whether the
policy affected the number of bedrooms per person (Columns 1-3), the
number of bedrooms in the household (Columns 4–6) or the number of
people in the household (Columns 7–9). These are all margins along
which we might expect to see some adjustment – if the policy worked as
expected and increased efﬁcient occupancy of space. In this table, we
separate out the effects for movers and stayers (Columns 2, 5, 7) as we did
in Table 2. Furthermore, we focus on our favourite speciﬁcation that does
not control for ‘post’ periods interacted with the pre-policy number of
bedrooms per person. The ﬁrst column of Table 5 shows that the policy
led to a small reduction in the number of bedrooms per person in the full
sample (0.1 rooms per person). As might be expected, Column (2) and
(3) show that all of this effect is concentrated among movers, who
experience a 0.4 reduction in the number of rooms per person following
relocation (Column 2, row 2), whereas we ﬁnd no change for stayers
(ﬁrst row of Column 3).
From the rest of the table it is evident that the change in bedrooms per
person comes primarily from movers choosing smaller accommodation.
We ﬁnd a small overall effect on number of bedrooms (0.16 rooms,
Column 4) that is completely explained by changes in accommodation
size for movers. Treated movers experience almost a one-room reduction
(0.8) relative to control households when they relocate – in line with
what is expected if individuals comply with the policy and avoid the
under-occupancy penalty. In contrast, movers unaffected by the policy
tended to move to bigger housing (an additional 0.3 bedrooms). Taken
together, the results of Tables 4 and 5 imply that although the policy did
not encourage people to move, it did encourage people to downsize
relative to the control group when they did so. Evidently, the policy has
the potential to shift the equilibrium use of social housing space in the
long run – as tenants move out of homes for other reasons – but these
changes depend on the natural turnover rate and will occur at a slower
rate than might have been intended (i.e., had the policy had an impact on
mobility).
The ﬁnal columns of Table 5 look at whether household size changes
in response to the policy. We ﬁnd this is not the case: while household
size did increase on average post-policy for movers (by 0.15 people), the
treatment and control groups are no different in this respect. We further
investigated whether there were changes in the number of very young
babies, young people (age 16–21), working age adults, near retirees, and
adults who are not family members (potential ‘lodgers’). Irrespective of
the speciﬁc groups we consider, we never detect any sizeable and sig-
niﬁcant effect. This suggests that anecdotal evidence and media ‘ru-
mours’ about social tenants subletting their space or having children to
by-pass the bedroom tax ﬁnd no empirical support in our data.
5.3. Effects on other outcomes: income, employment, savings, food
expenditure, deprivation and satisfaction
In this section, we look the impact of the bedroom tax on the other
outcomes related to changes in household behaviour and experience that
we discussed in Section 2.2. Our ﬁndings are presented in Tables 6 and 7.
We report results for the full sample that pools stayers and movers,
though the results for the stayers' sample are similar.
The ﬁrst column of Table 6 suggests that treated households experi-
enced a £27 per week fall in total income relative to the control house-
holds, signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This reduction is much more
substantial than the £10 reduction in housing beneﬁt reported in Table 2.
The reason for this drop becomes evident in Columns (2) and (3), which
look at labour income and total beneﬁt income. Total labour income in
the household falls by nearly £20, while total beneﬁts fall by nearly £8 –
in line with the fall in housing beneﬁt documented above although the
effect here is non-signiﬁcant (note that total beneﬁts include housing as
well as unemployment, disability, child and other beneﬁts). The fall in










Sample All All All
Beds./person*Post N N Y
Age*Post N Y Y
Tenure*Post N Y Y
Household FE Y Y Y
Wave FE Y Y Y
LA*Year FE Y Y Y
Quarter*Year FE Y Y Y
Observations 4148 3764 3764
R-squared 0.545 0.558 0.559
Note: Table reports regression coefﬁcients and standard errors. Standard errors
clustered at the household level. For other notes, see Table 2. *: signiﬁcant at
10% level; **: signiﬁcant at 5% level; ***: signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Fig. 1. Event studies of the policy effect on housing beneﬁt.
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working) in Column (4), the point estimate implies a sizeable reduction –
26% less employment in affected households – although this effect is
non-signiﬁcant (note that this effect becomes signiﬁcant at the 5% and
stays at a similar magnitude if we take out the interactions between the
post indicator and pre-policy average age and tenure length from the
regression).
In additional regressions (not reported), we found no signiﬁcant ef-
fect on hours worked or part-time versus full time either – though the
general pattern from these additional results conﬁrmed that affected
households worked less. For example, we found a 12%–17% reduction in
total hours worked in the household (though this effect was not signiﬁ-
cant at conventional level).
As noted in Section 2.2, basic economics would predict an increase in
labour supply due to the reduction in non-labour income. However, the9incentives in our context are complex due to the beneﬁt withdrawal rate
as employment income increases above certain thresholds, and because
of the interdependency in the employment decisions between household
members. In amore detailed analysis, we used individual level data to see
whether there were any speciﬁc effects on employment and labour in-
come related to particular types of household members – namely,
younger people, older people, males or females – but found no important
nor statistically signiﬁcant patterns (reported in the working paper
version of this paper; Gibbons et al., 2018). Unfortunately, we are unable
to shed more light on why individuals are observed to work less in
response to the bedroom tax. As discussed in Chetty et al. (2009), in-
dividuals make systematic optimisation errors even when policies are
relatively simple – so irrational behavioural changes in response to the
bedroom tax are not implausible. Given the data at hand, this possibility
can only remain a conjecture.
Lastly, we ﬁnd that, despite the overall reduction in household in-
come, households do not seem to be less likely to save, nor spending less
on food (Columns 5 and 6). In fact, the point estimates suggest increases
on both outcomes for treated households relative to controls, although
neither coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant.
To conclude, we look at potential consequences of the reductions in
housing beneﬁt and income documented so far in terms of households'
wellbeing. Table 7 reports results from regressions with indicators of
material deprivation and self-reported satisfaction as dependent vari-
ables. The basic message from this table is that life experience worsened
for treated households in ways that might have been expected – with
higher indices of material deprivation in terms of ﬁnancial stress, fewer
durable goods purchases and higher overall material deprivation as well
as reductions in satisfaction with health, income and life overall. On the
other hand, none of these estimates is signiﬁcant and treated households
report a relative improvement in their satisfaction with leisure time
(perhaps commensurate with the reduction in employment and hours
worked discussed in relation to Table 6).
Table 5
Bedrooms per person, number of bedrooms and number of people.
Bedrooms per person Number of bedrooms Number of people































Sample All All Stayers All All Stayers All All Stayers
Age*Post Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Tenure*Post Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3764 3764 2903 3764 3764 2903 3764 3764 2903
R-squared 0.919 0.922 0.937 0.969 0.972 0.996 0.968 0.968 0.973
Note: Table reports regression coefﬁcients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. For other notes, see Table 2. *: signiﬁcant at 10% level;
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level; ***: signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Table 6


























Sample All All All All All All
Age*Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Tenure*Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 3764 3563 3764 3764 3764 3734
Note: Table reports regression coefﬁcients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. For other notes, see Table 2. *: signiﬁcant at 10% level;
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level; ***: signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Table 7
Material deprivation and satisfaction.
Material deprivation Satisfaction
Lifestyle changes Financial stress Durable goods purchase Overall Health Income Leisure time Life overall

















Sample All All All All All All All All
Age*Post Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Tenure*Post Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2419 3761 3744 2407 3349 3343 3343 3346
R-squared 0.789 0.667 0.838 0.852 0.724 0.728 0.672 0.744
Note: Table reports regression coefﬁcients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. In all columns, the dependent variables have been
standardised. See main text for a description of the various indicators used to construct the material deprivation outcomes. More positive values of overall material
deprivation, lifestyle changes and ﬁnancial stress correspond to worse outcomes. More positive values of durable good purchase correspond to better outcomes. For
other notes, see Table 2. *: signiﬁcant at 10% level; **: signiﬁcant at 5% level; ***: signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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affected by the bedroom tax experience a loss in income relative to un-
affected households. This reduction is more than the one implied by the
housing beneﬁt cut mandated for families with a spare room. However,
the margins on which households adjust to this loss of income are
obscure – with no changes in consumption and saving patterns. The
policy might have worsened households' standard of living and life
satisfaction – although our estimates are imprecise.
5.4. Geographical heterogeneity
The results so far have described the picture on average for the whole
of England andWales. An important question is to what extent the effects
differ across cities, within cities and across other types of geography.
We investigated this issue by studying whether our results differ
along the along following dimensions: urban versus rural; London versus
rest of England; high rent versus low rent areas; and distance between
place of residence and city centre. Broadly speaking, we ﬁnd no evidence
of striking and signiﬁcant heterogeneity, but a few patterns are worth
mentioning. A subset of results, along with explanations of howwe deﬁne
these geographical categories, are presented in Appendix Table A1.
The most important differences relate to urban, high rent areas –
especially London – versus other areas in England and Wales. The effect
on beneﬁts is generally larger in urban areas and high market rent areas,
and particularly so in London. Conversely, the policy effect on total
household income – driven by labour income – moves in the opposite
direction with treated households in places outside of London beingmore
negatively affected.
Results on within-city patterns imply that the adverse effects of the
bedroom tax on beneﬁts and incomewere worse for tenants living further
out from the centre of cities, but the differences are not signiﬁcant and as
a result our ﬁndings are not conclusive.
In terms of the other outcomes, we ﬁnd no clear patterns for mobility,
material deprivation and life satisfaction. Given the imprecision in these
results, it is hardly worth speculating over what drives them. The most
important lesson from this geographical analysis is that there is nothing
to suggest that the baseline results presented in Tables 2–7 are unrep-
resentative of the experience of the majority of the social tenant popu-
lation in England and Wales.
6. Concluding remarks
We have studied the impact of an under-occupancy penalty policy –
nick-named the bedroom tax – aimed at reducing the burden to the tax
payer of housing subsidies in the UK by rationing social tenants' use of
space. Our study is the ﬁrst to present an evaluation of this reform using a
difference-in-difference methodology and considering a range of out-
comes on which the policy was expected to have some impact.
In a nutshell, we ﬁnd that the policy reduced housing beneﬁts for
social tenant households with a spare bedroom, relative to those without
a spare bedroom. The reduction, although small in absolute terms, is non-
negligible given the low baseline income of the affected households
(around 3.5% of their total income). These affected households experi-
enced further losses in overall income, stemming from reductions in la-
bour income and a tendency to work less relative to the control group.
The policy did not encourage residential moves, but it did incentivise
people to downsize when they moved in the course of natural residential11turnover. The implication is that the policy was only partly successful in
one of its stated aims – namely, rationalising the use of publicly-funded
housing and addressing the problem of over-occupied and under-
occupied dwellings co-existing in the system. In the long run, under-
occupancy of social housing might be reduced, but this change will
only occur in conjunction with the natural turnover of tenants in social
housing. In the short run, the affected groups simply suffered a loss of
disposable income. The non-response in terms of mobility was unlikely
due to a lack of information about the policy or a lack of salience (as in
Chetty et al., 2009). The policy was widely publicised, and affected
tenants would have either experienced direct cuts in their housing ben-
eﬁts or written demands for the shortfall in their rents – making it un-
likely that the bedroom tax went unnoticed.
Our evidence gives some credence to critics of the policy who argued
that it would further strain the ﬁnances and standards of living of already
worse-off individuals – without generating any beneﬁts besides a
reduction in the amount of public spending devoted to housing subsidies.
While our estimates are too imprecise to be fully conﬁdent, their ﬂavour
is in line with the qualitative work by Moffatt et al. (2016) who argue
that policy had adverse effects on households' poverty, wellbeing and
health.
Another concern with the policy was that it would hollow out com-
munities, increase neighbourhood turnover, deprive poor children of a
stable learning environment (with possible detrimental effects on their
education, see Gibbons et al., 2017) by forcing people to move, and push
individuals already at the risk of being detached from the labour market
to areas with even fewer employment opportunities. Our ﬁndings that
the policy did not signiﬁcantly affect individuals' mobility allay this
concern. This reluctance to relocate due to family and community ties is
also documented in a small-scale qualitative study of families in Man-
chester (Bragg et al., 2015).
An obvious question is whether this policy really saved tax payers in
the UK any money. It was expected that the policy would affect 660,000
households at the time it was introduced. Based on the £10 per week
beneﬁts cut in our estimates, the direct savings would be around £350
million per year – seventy percent of the government's own estimates of
total savings. These savings will also have been partly offset by the
discretionary payments that the government boosted in order to help
support families adversely affected by the bedroom tax – around £60
million per year up to 2015/16. The bottom line is that the policy seems
to have saved some money – though not as much as expected – with the
burden falling on the affected tenants.19
The general lesson from these ﬁndings is that this type of policy has
limited power to change housing consumption or affect households'
employment decisions in the short run. It might reduce the costs to the
taxpayer of housing subsidies, but at a direct ﬁnancial cost to social
tenants who are unable or unwilling to downsize.
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(0.199)Observations 3762 3762 3762 3762 2406 3344Sample All All All All All All
Age*Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Tenure*Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y YNote: Table reports regression coefﬁcients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. Results in each cell come from different regressions.
‘Urban’ is an urban/rural indicator based on the ONS deﬁnition that classiﬁes settlements of 10,000 inhabitants or more as urban and rural otherwise. ‘London’ is an
indicator for London as opposed to the rest of England and Wales. ‘LRR below median’ is an indicator for below-above the median local reference rent in 2012 in the
broad rental market area (BRMA) where the household is located. LRRs are used to calculate local housing allowances (LHA) that anchor the subsidies that can be
claimed by households on beneﬁts renting private accommodation. ‘Distance to the city centre’ measures distance to the closest city centre (population>10,000) in log
meters. For other notes, see Table 2. *: signiﬁcant at 10% level. **: signiﬁcant at 5% level. ***: signiﬁcant at 1% level.References
Belﬁeld, C., Cribb, J., Hood, A., Joyce, R., 2014. Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality
in the UK: 2014. Institute for Fiscal Studies Report N. 96, London.
Braackman, N., McDonald, S., 2018. Housing Subsidies and Property Prices: Evidence
from England. Regional Science and Urban Economics, forthcoming.
Bragg, Joanna, Burman, Erica, Greenstein, Anat, Hanley, Terry, Kalambouka, Afroditi,
Lupton, Ruth, McCoy, Lauren, Sapin, Kate, Winter, Laura Anne, 2015. The Impacts of
the ‘Bedroom Tax’ on Children and Their Education: a Study in the City of
Manchester. University of Manchester.
Brewer, M., Emmerson, C., Hood, A., Joyce, R., 2014. Econometric Analysis of the
Impacts of Local Housing Allowance Reforms on Existing Claimants. Department for
Work and Pensions Research Report no. 871.
Clarke, A., Hill, L., Marshall, B., Oxley, M., Pereira, I., Thomson, E., Williams, P., 2015.
Evaluation of Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy: Final Report. Department for
Work and Pensions.
Chetty, R., Looney, A., Kroft, K., 2009. Salience and taxation: theory and evidence. Am.
Econ. Rev. 99 (4), 1145–1177.
Fack, G., 2006. Are housing beneﬁt an effective way to redistribute income? Evidence
from a natural experiment in France. Lab. Econ. 13 (6), 747–771.Gibbons, S., Manning, A., 2006. The incidence of UK Housing Beneﬁt: evidence from the
1990s reforms. J. Publ. Econ. 90 (4–5), 799–822.
Gibbons, S., Silva, O., Weinhardt, F., 2017. Neighbourhood turnover and teenage
attainment. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 15 (4), 746–783.
Gibbons, S., Sanchez-Vidal, M., Silva, O., 2018. The Bedroom Tax. Centre for Economic
Performance Discussion Paper N. 15378, London School of Economics.
HCA, 2015. Rent Standard Guidance. Homes and Communities Agency, London available
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rent-standard-guidance.
(Accessed March 2018).
Hills, J., 2007. Ends and Means: the Future Roles of Social Housing in England. CASE-LSE
Report N. 34.
Holmans, A., 2005. Housing and Housing Policy in England 1975–2002. Report to the
Ofﬁce of the Deputy Prime Minister, London.
Kangasharju, A., 2010. Housing allowance and the rent of low-income households. Scand.
J. Econ. 112 (3), 595–617.
McFall, S.L., Garrington, C. (Eds.), 2011. Early Findings from the First Wave of the UK's
Household Longitudinal Study. Institute for Social and Economic Research,
University of Essex, Colchester (UK).
Moffatt, S., Lawson, S., Patterson, R., Holding, E., Dennison, A., Sowden, S., Brown, J.,
2016. A qualitative study of the impact of the UK ‘bedroom tax’. J. Public Health 38
(2), 197–205.
S. Gibbons et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics xxx (xxxx) xxxShelter, 2013. “What's Wrong with the Bedroom Tax?” Policy Brieﬁng. Shelter, London
available at: https://england.shelter.org.uk/professional_resources/policy_and_
research/policy_library/policy_library_folder/brieﬁng_whats_wrong_with_the_
bedroom_tax. (Accessed November 2017).
Susin, S., 2002. Rent vouchers and the price of low-income housing. J. Publ. Econ. 83 (1),
109–152.13Udagawa, C., Tang, C.P.Y., 2008. Private Rents and Rental Rates of Return, 1996/97 to
2006/07. Cambridge Centre for Housing and Planning Research, Cambridge
available at: https://www.cchpr.landecon.cam.ac.uk/Projects/Start-Year/2007/
Comparative-analysis-of-private-and-social-sectors-rates-of-return/Rents-rates-of-
return-1998-99-to-2006-07/PRS-Report. (Accessed March 2018).
Viren, M., 2013. Is the housing allowance shifted to rental prices? Empir. Econ. 44 (3),
1497–1518.
